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Abstract 
 
We review empirical evidence on the ability of decentralization to enhance preference 
matching and technical efficiency in the provision of health and education in developing 
countries. Many influential surveys have found that the empirical evidence of 
decentralization’s effects on service delivery is weak, incomplete and often contradictory. 
Our own unweighted reading of the literature concurs.  But when we organize the 
evidence first by substantive theme, and then – crucially – by empirical quality and the 
credibility of its identification strategy, clear patterns emerge. Higher quality evidence 
indicates that decentralization increases technical efficiency across a variety of public 
services, from student test scores to infant mortality rates. Decentralization also improves 
preference matching in education, and can do so in health under certain conditions, 
although there is less evidence for both. We discuss individual studies in some detail.  
Weighting by quality is especially important when evidence informs policy-making. 
Firmer conclusions will require an increased focus on research design, and a deeper 
examination into the prerequisites and mechanisms of successful reforms. 
 
 
 
Keywords:  Decentralization, School-Based Management, Education, Health, Service 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In the late 1990s it was estimated that 80 percent of the world’s countries were 
experimenting with one form or another of decentralization (Manor 1999).  Since then, 
new or deepening reforms have been announced in nations as diverse as Bolivia, 
Cambodia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, Turkey, and 
many others. By now it is safe to say that experiments with, and enthusiasm for, 
decentralization are essentially ubiquitous across the globe. 
Theories underpinning such enthusiasm are compelling and argue that by taking the 
government “closer to the people”, decentralization can improve the responsiveness and 
accountability of the state, decrease corruption, increase the political voice and 
participation of ordinary citizens, and also reduce bureaucracy and lower the unit costs of 
government expenditure. The slogan “closer to the people” can be decomposed into 
three underlying analytical advantages that local governments have over central 
government: (a) superior information on local conditions and needs, (b) greater 
participation of citizens in decision making and the production of local services, and (c) 
greater accountability of public officials to voters.  The local governments possessing 
such advantages preside over jurisdictions that are smaller and more homogeneous than 
those of national government. Local governments’ decision making will thus be 
facilitated by not having to cater to a more diverse set of needs and wants. With superior 
information, participation, accountability, and policy challenges that are less onerous, it 
follows logically that decentralization should improve public services. 
Yet the many surveys of the literature overwhelmingly agree that empirical evidence 
is inconclusive. In one of the earliest reviews, for instance, Rondinelli et al. (1983) note 
that decentralization seldom, if ever, lived up to its promise. Shah et al. (2004) concur in 
a review of 56 studies published since the late 1990’s, chronicling that decentralization 
in some cases improved, and in others worsened, service delivery, corruption and growth 
across a large range of countries. Treisman’s (2007) more recent survey is bleaker still. 
“To date,” he says, “there are almost no solidly established, general empirical findings 
about the consequences of decentralization” (p. 250). The lack of consensus on 
decentralization’s effects over 25 years and literally hundreds of studies is striking.  
One of the main challenges faced by such review efforts is the sheer size and 
diversity of scholarship. The empirical literature on decentralization originates from a 
variety of disciplines, including public economics, development studies and comparative 
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politics, to name just a few. Evaluations of reforms are done in markedly different ways 
and focus on very different outcomes, ranging from service delivery to corruption to 
macro-economic stability and happiness. Any attempt to review these results as a whole 
quickly loses the forest for the trees in a confusion of particular findings that may appear 
contradictory, but are more often simply different. To draw firmer conclusions from this 
vast literature, we argue, a clearer organizing principle is required – a principle that 
allows students of decentralization to neatly compare the causal effects of a similar kind 
of reform on similar predefined outcomes. 
In this review we apply such an organizing principle to assess decentralization’s 
ability to enhance service delivery in developing nations. Decentralization, defined here 
as “the transfer of authority for decision-making, finance, and management to quasi-
autonomous units of local governments” (Litvack and Seddon 1999: pp.3), is probably 
the single most advocated measure for improving the provision of health and education 
in the developing world. This popularity is not surprising. Of the many arguments in 
favor of decentralization, the most important is that devolving power and resources to 
local governments can increase the accountability of public servants, and hence the 
responsiveness of public services to citizens’ needs (Faguet 2012 and 2008). While 
decentralizers’ motives have no doubt differed across different countries, improved 
delivery of public goods has been at least an implicit goal of most reforms, and usually 
an explicit one. 
To ensure that our conclusions on decentralized public provision of health and 
education are not influenced by an arbitrarily selected group of studies, we use 
predefined criteria to identify papers for inclusion in this survey. Specifically, we focus 
on empirical evidence in the economics literature from the last 20 years that evaluates 
the causal effect of decentralization on service delivery in developing nations. We group 
these studies according to the main substantive themes they address as follows: 1) 
Preference matching1, defined as the extent to which public goods provided by local 
governments match citizens’ preferences or demands, and/or 2) Technical efficiency, 
meaning the production of more or better public goods by a decentralized government 
for a given set of inputs. In the latter theme, we further segregate the evidence into sub-
categories based on whether it concerns the provision of (i) health, (ii) education to 
                                                 
1 In the decentralization policy literature, the term allocative efficiency is often used to refer to this same 
concept. 
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lower tiers of the government, or (iii) education to schools in what is commonly referred 
to as a School-Based Management (SBM) reform. 
Within this thematic classification, we further classify studies according to the self-
reported quality of their data and credibility of their identification strategies, and place 
greater weight on what high-quality evidence has to say. Distinguishing between studies 
that are able to tease out the causal effects of decentralization more plausibly than others 
is the crucial step that allows us to identify patterns in the findings. Earlier empirical 
contributions on decentralization were commonly plagued by problems of attribution – 
surveys based on such evidence therefore had similar challenges in isolating the effects 
of reform. In recent years a deeper appreciation of the pitfalls associated with causal 
inference has pushed empiricists to find more credible identification strategies that use 
observational data to construct valid counterfactuals, and thus approximate the ‘gold 
standard’ of randomized experiments2. This is the higher quality literature we focus on 
in our review. 
The following sections lay out our methodology and results, and then discuss and 
contrast individual studies in some detail.  But it may be useful to first summarize our 
findings.  
 
 The overall evidence base is thin, although this varies by category 
We find that the overall evidence base on decentralized health and service 
delivery in developing countries is thin. Only 35 studies meet the selection 
criteria detailed in section 2 below. 
 
We also find that the distribution of scholarship is skewed by theme (preference 
matching vs. technical efficiency) and sub-category (health, education, SBM). 
For example, many more studies focus on how decentralization affects technical 
efficiency than preference matching. Likewise, education and SBM have been 
the subject of examination much more often than health. The papers reviewed 
are summarized by theme and sub-category in Table 1. 
 
                                                 
2 See Angrist and Pischke 2010 for a good discussion on identification strategies 
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 The econometric techniques employed by studies are less sophisticated than we 
would prefer 
Fewer than a third of the papers reviewed can be classified as having a highly 
credible identification strategy. Our categorization hinges on the ability of the 
methodologies employed to mitigate endogeneity concerns, in accordance with 
the established hierarchy of econometric techniques.  Hence, for example, 
randomized and quasi-randomized evidence are considered to have stronger 
identification strategies than cross-sectional work. Table 2 describes how we 
categorize the credibility of a study’s empirical design in detail. 
 
In this particular sense, the “quality” of the studies reviewed also varies 
substantially by theme and sub-category. Papers in the technical efficiency 
theme, and specifically studies investigating school decentralization reforms, 
appear to have a greater number of high quality contributions. By contrast, 
contributions in the preference matching category are not only fewer but also less 
rigorous, making the task of drawing conclusions from this group difficult. 
 
 Externalities in health drive pessimism in the preference matching theme 
Our review indicates that pessimism in the small preference matching literature 
is due primarily to the externalities that characterize the health sector. 
Decentralized local governments often match local preferences more efficiently 
while ignoring spillover effects on neighboring regions, as some of the classic 
public economics literature predicts (Oates 1972; Rubinfeld 1987), thus reducing 
overall social welfare. The evidence of preference matching in education 
delivery, on the other hand, appears to be somewhat positive. But the small size 
of this body of work limits firmer conclusions. 
 
 Higher quality work on technical efficiency appears to be favorable 
Importantly, evidence on technical efficiency is on the whole optimistic. This 
optimism rises with the quality of the evidence. The highest quality empirics 
show that decentralization can enhance a variety of service delivery outcomes, 
from student test scores to infant mortality rates. 
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Although such results are not conclusive, they do demonstrate the potential of 
decentralization to enhance service delivery in developing countries. Stronger 
conclusions are not possible until the field sees a more general shift towards 
better research design, and the development of a deeper understanding of the 
prerequisites and mechanisms of successful reforms. 
 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the criteria used for 
including and classifying studies in this review. Section 3 discusses the papers included 
by theme. We conclude by comparing our findings to broad surveys of the literature and 
suggesting priorities for future research. The papers reviewed are summarized in Tables 
1 to 4. Our aim is to provide insights into patterns of findings on one piece of the larger 
decentralization puzzle. What follows hopefully helps to answer some important 
question surrounding decentralized service delivery of health and education in 
developing countries. Even so, we do not pretend that this survey can cover more than a 
fraction of a huge literature. 
 
2.  Scope and Methodology of Review 
 
This section describes the steps we undertook to identify, organize and classify 
studies from this vast literature for our review. Our strategy was to conduct a wide search 
and then systematically filter papers that met predefined criteria for relevance. Following 
this, we arranged the literature first by substantive theme, and then – crucially – by 
quality of the evidence. The latter step allows us to see empirical patterns in the 
scholarship that broad decentralization reviews have not previously uncovered. 
 
2.1 Identifying and Organizing the Literature 
We began our search by focusing on published and unpublished working papers 
found on EconLit, an established bibliography of economics literature. Using the key 
words “decentralization” or “devolution” in conjunction with either “education”, 
“health” or “service delivery”, we first conducted our search in October 2010, and then 
subsequently updated it in December 2011.  
The EconLit database yielded approximately 350 studies on decentralization and 
health, and some 350 more on decentralization and education. To ensure thorough 
coverage we then cast a wider net, consulting other key resources such as Google 
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Scholar, JSTOR, SCOPUS and Web of Knowledge. We also referred to major 
publications by international organizations such as the World Bank, used citation 
indices, and reviewed reference lists in identified papers to confirm that no critical 
contributions were omitted from our review. This pushed the total number of studies 
above 1,000. 
Based on the information contained in their abstracts, we selected those studies that 
a) were of an empirical nature, b) dealt specifically with decentralization of service 
delivery of health and/or education in developing nations3, and c) date from 1992 or 
later. This reduced the sample dramatically to 35 contributions. We then organized this 
short-listed body of evidence into our two themes: preference-matching, and technical 
efficiency. The body of scholarship on technical efficiency is larger, and therefore we 
further segregated the papers examined into sub-categories based on whether they 
address: (1) decentralization of health, (2) decentralization of education to lower tiers of 
governments, or (3) decentralization of education to schools or School-Based 
Management.  
Table 1 summarizes the evidence by theme, sub-category, author, publication type, 
and countries covered. 
                                                 
3 For a good review of empirical evidence from OECD and other developed nations, refer to Ahmad, 
Brosio and Tanzi (2008) and Ahmad and Brosio (2009). 
 Table 1: Summary of Evidence Reviewed
Region Author
PM TE Health Educ. SBM Journal Book
Working 
Paper
Other 
Unpublished Description
Africa
1 Kenya Duflo et al (2007) X X X Unpublished manuscript
2 Madagascar Glewwe and Maiga (2011) X X X Journal of Development Effectiveness
3 Uganda Akin et al (2005) X X X Journal of Development Studies
Asia
4 China Uchimura and Jutting (2009) X X X World Development
5 India Asfaw et al (2007) X X X Journal of Developing Areas
6 Indonesia Skoufias et al (2011) X X X X World Bank Policy Research Paper Series
7 Pakistan Hasnain (2008) X X X X World Bank Policy Research Paper Series
8 Pakistan Aslam and Yilmaz (2011) X X X Public Administration and Development
9 Philippines Schwartz et al (2002) X X X MEASURE Evaluation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
10 Philippines Jimenez and Paqueo (1996) X X X Economics of Education Review
11 Philippines Lockheed and Zhao (1993) X X X International Journal of Educational Development
12 Philippines Khattri et al (2010) X X X World Bank Policy Research Paper Series
13 Russia Frienkman and Plekhanov (2009) X X X X World Development
Latin & Central America
14 Argentina Habibi et al (2003) X X X X Journal of Human Development
15 Argentina Galiani et al (2008) X X X Journal of Public Economics
16 Argentina Eskeland and Filmer (2007) X X X World Bank Policy Research Paper Series
17 Bolivia Faguet (2012) X X X X Book
18 Bolivia Faguet (2004) X X X X Journal of Public Economics
19 Bolivia Inchauste (2009) X X X X Book Chapter
20 Brazil Paes de Barros and Mendonca (1998) X X X Organization matters: agency problems in health and education in Latin America
21 Chile Di Gropello (2002) X X X X World Bank Economists' Forum
22 Colombia Faguet and Sanchez (2008) X X X World Development
23 El Salvador Jimenez and Sawada (1999) X X X The World Bank Economic Review 
24 El Salvador Sawada and Ragatz (2005) X X X Book Chapter in World Bank Publication
25 Honduras Di Gropello and Marshall (2005) X X X Book Chapter in World Bank Publication
26 Mexico Gertler et al (2011) X X X Journal of Development Economics
27 Mexico Skoufias and Shapiro (2006) X X X World Bank Policy Research Paper Series
28 Nicaragua King and Ozler (2000) X X X World Bank Policy Research Paper Series
29 Nicaragua Parker (2005) X X X Book Chapter in World Bank Publication
Cross-country
30 Various Arze del Granado et al (2005) X X X X Georgia State University
31 Various Gunnarsson et al (2009) X X X Economic Development and Cultural Change 
32 Various Hanushek et al (2011) X X X NBER Working Paper Series
33 Various Khaleghian (2004) X X X Social Science and Medicine
34 Various Robalino et al (2001) X X X World Bank Policy Research Paper Series
35 Various Treisman (2002) X X X X Unpublished manuscript
Total 7 28 12 16 14 18 4 9 3
Notes
PM: Preference Matching
TE: Technical Efficiency
SBM: School-based Management
By Theme By Type of PublicationBy Sub-Category
2.3 Quality of the Evidence 
Next we evaluated the quality of the evidence. We do so in the knowledge that 
researchers attempting to assess the effects of decentralization on education and health 
services face a number of difficult challenges.  These include the difficulty of 
disaggregating decentralization’s effects from (a) the other reforms that often accompany 
it, and – more importantly – (b) from country politics, which necessarily plays a crucial 
role in both decentralization’s impetus as well as its eventual effects. Together these 
impose sizeable data demands on researchers. Add to these problems the time it takes for 
service delivery outcomes to change, and the difficulty of conducting randomized 
decentralization experiments, and the varying quality of the evidence seems fully 
justified. 
To classify the persuasiveness of each paper’s identification strategy, we use a four 
point scale of Very Strongly Credible, Strongly Credible, Somewhat Credible, and Less 
Credible. In our categorization, the primary consideration is the nature of the data 
available and the identification strategy this permits. In effect, we rank papers’ empirical 
methodologies according to their widely accepted abilities to mitigate endogeneity 
concerns and identify causal effects. For this we rely on the established hierarchy of 
identification strategies in economics as widely taught in graduate programs today. We 
supplement our quality distinctions by reviewing the covariates included in analysis, the 
measures used for decentralization4, the self-reported quality of data, and the nature of 
robustness checks performed in the paper. This scale, along with a snapshot of how 
papers in this survey have been classified, is presented in Table 2. The categorization is 
adapted from a similar typology by Santibañez (2006). 
 
                                                 
4 For a good discussion on challenges of measuring decentralization, see Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) 
 
  
Table 2: Quality Distinctions
Scale Criteria
Generally Positive 
Findings
Generally Insignificant or 
Negative Findings
Generally Positive 
Findings
Generally Insignificant or 
Negative Findings
H
ea
lth - ▪ Hasnain (2008)
▪ Schwartz et al (2002)
- ▪ Treisman (2002)
Ed
uc
at
io
n - ▪ Hasnain (2008)
▪ Freinkman and Plekhanov 
(2009)
▪ Di Gropello (2002)
▪ Jimenez and Paqueo (1996)
▪ Lockheed and Zhao (1993)
▪ Treisman (2002)
SB
M - - ▪ Eskeland and Filmer (2007)
H
ea
lth
 
▪ Arze del Granado et al 
(2005)
▪ Akin et al (2005) ▪ Asfaw et al (2007)
▪ Robalino et al (2001)
▪ Habibi et al (2003)
▪ Inchauste (2009)
▪ Khaleghian (2003)
Ed
uc
at
io
n ▪ Arze del Granado et al 
(2005)
- ▪ Aslam and Yilmaz (2011)
▪ Freinkman and Plekhanov 
(2009)
▪ Inchauste (2009)
SB
M
- - ▪ Paes de Barros and 
Mendonca (1998)
▪ King and Ozler (2000)
▪ Khattri et al (2010)
▪ Parker (2005)
▪ Di Gropello and Marshall 
(2005)
▪ Gunnarsson et al (2009)
▪ Jimenez and Sawada (1999)
▪ Sawada and Ragataz (2005)
Preference Matching Technical efficiency
Less Credible 
Identification 
Strategy
▪ Research that bases findings on self-selected populations, and 
makes little to no effort to produce a valid comparison group. 
▪ Work that is likely to suffer from serious omitted variable bias and 
other endogeneity issues such as those related to measurement 
error due to self-reported poor quality of data. 
▪ Most cross-sectional work that does not use any other 
sophisticated methodology to address endogeneity will fall in this 
category. 
Somewhat 
Credible 
Identification 
Strategy
▪  Research that attempts to construct a valid comparison group but 
does so with limited success. 
▪ Work that is likely to continue to suffer from some endogeneity 
biases in spite of efforts at mitigation.
▪ Cross-sectional work that uses matching techniques, for instance, 
falls in this group. Other studies using panel estimation may also fall 
in this group if they use random effects or between effects. Papers 
using difference in differences but without providing any support of its 
key identifying assumption of parallel trends, papers using IV that are 
not considered particularly strong and papers using fixed effects but 
with very limited covariates also fall here. 
▪ Finally, preference matching studies that only establish a change in 
allocation patterns but not any enhanced alignment to citizen 
preferences also are in this category. 
▪ Compared to previous category, work in this group generally 
attempts to validate the measure of decentralization through use of 
multiple measures or qualitative validation.
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H
ea
lth - ▪ Faguet (2004)
▪ Faguet (2012)
▪ Skoufias et al (2011)
▪ Uchimura and Jutting (2009)
Ed
uc
at
io
n
▪ Faguet (2004)
▪ Faguet (2012)
▪ Skoufias et al (2011)
- ▪ Galiani et al (2008)
▪ Faguet and Sanchez (2008)
SB
M - - ▪ Skoufias and Shapiro 
(2006)
▪ Gertler et al (2011)
▪ Hanushek et al (2011)
H
ea
lth - - - -
Ed
uc
at
io
n - - - -
SB
M - - ▪ Duflo et al (2007) ▪ Glewwe and Maiga (2011)
▪ Studies with very strong research design such as randomized 
control trials that have a valid control group fall here.
▪ Work that is likely to have limited endogeneity concerns.
Very Strongly 
Credible 
Identification 
Strategy
Strongly Credible 
Identification 
Strategy
▪ Research that is able to construct a reasonable comparison group. 
▪ Work that specifically attempts to address sources of endogeneity 
and is mostlys successful in its attempt. 
▪ Most of the studies in this category quasi-experimental designs 
such as difference in differences and instrumental variables. Papers 
providing panel estimates in a fixed effects model while controlling for 
more than one socio-economic covariate and more than one 
covariate from the health/education production function also fall here.
Our top category, Very Strongly Credible, consists of randomized control trials 
(RCTs), the ‘gold standard’ for identifying causal effects. At the other end of the 
spectrum, work that relies on simpler quantitative methods such as ordinary least squares 
(OLS), and fails to employ any more sophisticated methodology to control for 
endogeneity bias, is categorized as having a design that is Less Credible in drawing 
causal inferences. The papers we place in this category are mostly cross-sectional OLS 
analyses of observational data. Because studies here attempt to draw findings from self-
selected populations without being able to construct a valid comparison group, their 
ability to make causal claims is limited when compared to studies that use more 
sophisticated econometric methods. 
How do we place work into the two middle groupings? The Strongly Credible 
category consists of research that is reasonably successful in producing a valid 
comparison group. Much of this literature uses quasi-experimental techniques such as 
instrumental variables (IV) or difference in differences (DID) approaches. The key issue 
for being classed as Strongly Credible is how persuasive studies are in communicating a 
thorough understanding of the institutional environment and then – importantly – using 
this understanding to design their empirical strategy.  
So for instance, Strongly Credible papers using IV techniques can make plausible 
claims for the relevance and exogeneity of their instruments.  Studies using difference in 
differences can persuade that the treatment is what is responsible for altering a trend 
between treatment and control groups. For this reason, the category also contains some 
panel data estimations using fixed effects and a set of relevant covariates, but only where 
the case for limited endogeneity based on knowledge of confounding factors is 
particularly convincing. 
The remaining studies are classed as Somewhat Credible. In our view, studies in this 
category are less persuasive in addressing endogeneity than those that are Strongly 
Credible, but more convincing than the Less Credible set due to their use of various 
kinds of comparison groups. This category thus houses diverse econometric methods, 
from matching to instrumental variables. 
It is worth underlining what this survey does not seek to do. We recognize that the 
identification strategies employed by researchers are largely determined by a 
combination of the data available, the nature of the reforms implemented, and the 
nuanced questions they seek to answer. Hence we make no attempt to rank papers’ 
broader quality as pieces of research, nor comment on the analytical skills of their 
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authors. What we do seek to do, rather, is recognize that there is an established hierarchy 
of rigor in econometric identification, and apply that hierarchy to the evidence that the 
literature provides.  This allows us to roughly categorize how convincing studies’ results 
are, where credibility is principally determined by what data is available, and hence how 
we should weight evidence when making policy. 
Henceforth we focus on the results of studies falling into the three stronger quality 
categories. Studies in the Less Credible category are occasionally highlighted when they 
present specific policy ideas that relate to studies in the more credible groups. 
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3. The Effects of Decentralization on Education and Health 
 
We now move on to the heart of our review, and describe the papers included in this 
survey in some detail. We first discuss preference matching and then turn to technical 
efficiency. Throughout this section, we make use of our quality distinctions when 
describing key papers in order to allow readers to understand how our conclusions are 
drawn. 
 
3.1 Preference Matching  
Although preference matching is one of the classic arguments posited in favor of 
decentralization (see Oates 1972), the empirical evidence devoted exclusively to testing 
this proposition is surprisingly small. It also produces somewhat contradictory results for 
the service delivery of education on one hand, and the provision of health on the other. 
The book and two papers we review with Strongly Credible identification strategies 
in the theme of preference matching yield somewhat contradictory findings. In one of the 
first papers to employ a before and after estimation strategy to examine preference 
matching, Faguet (2004; see also Faguet 2012 for a substantial update) finds favorable 
evidence from Bolivia. Bolivia undertook devolution in 1994, and as part of the reform 
moved responsibility of key public services to local governments. The shift in 
responsibility was accompanied by two other critical changes – the doubling of funds 
available to these devolved units during this period, and the establishment of oversight 
bodies to monitor local spending.  
Faguet examines the patterns of investment in public investment projects in a total of 
ten categories, including education and health, from 7 years before and 3 years after this 
reform. By doing so first for municipal averages, and then one by one for all 311 
municipalities examined, he finds a statistically significant increase in investment in 
education overall, as well as a statistically significant increase in 71% of individual 
municipalities in just three years after devolution. 
This shift in investment patterns was especially evident in poorer regions. As 
devolution increased funding to previously neglected regions, this finding is not 
necessarily an indication of greater preference matching. But Faguet then offers further 
evidence to support his responsiveness argument – he demonstrates that regions with 
high illiteracy levels, or where there seemed to be a greater need, invested more heavily 
in education. Regions with strong education indicators, on the other hand, prioritized 
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other sectors. This, he contends, “implies that local government is more sensitive to local 
need than central government” (p. 24). The author’s optimism is supported by similar 
findings in the sectors of water management and urban development, but noticeably not 
in our second sector of interest here – health.  
However, greater spending on socially oriented sectors does not necessarily imply 
that preference matching has improved. This is the main contrasting finding in Skoufias 
et al.’s (2011) recent working paper on Indonesia. The paper exploits an arguably 
exogenous phasing of local direct elections to conduct a difference in differences 
analysis of the effect of political decentralization on the pattern of public spending.  
Although fiscal and administrative devolution commenced in 1999 in the country, in 
2005 Indonesia implemented electoral reforms to enhance accountability in service 
delivery. The date local elections were held in a particular municipality depended on 
when the previously appointed head of government completed their tenure. Deviations in 
this timing were a result of illness, death, no confidence votes and the creation of new 
districts and thus, claim the authors, exogenous to spending allocation. 
Skoufias et al. compare changes in expenditure patterns in districts that held local 
elections in 2005 to patterns in districts that did not hold elections until 2008, after 
providing proof that pre-implementation trends in spending in both groups were similar. 
They find that political decentralization was associated with greater overall public 
spending – when disaggregated, however, they demonstrate that while there was an 
increase in the education sector, there was no significant difference in health spending. 
Skoufias et al. then follow Faguet (2004), attempting to use his methodology to establish 
whether these shifting patterns were based on local needs. In contrast to Faguet, 
however, they find no evidence to suggest an improvement in preference matching at all.     
The two contributions from the Somewhat Credible identification group are also 
contrary. In the only cross-country study concerned with preference matching that we 
review here, Arze del Granado et al. (2005) seek to establish that Faguet’s (2004) 
findings on the change in functional composition post decentralization in Bolivia are 
“not a unique experience of a specific country” (p. 4). Employing a before and after 
strategy similar to Faguet, but using data for 45 developed and developing countries over 
28 years, Arze del Granado et al. analyze the relationship between the ratio of local 
expenditure to total government expenditure as the measure of decentralization, and the 
ratio of health and education spending to overall spending.  
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The authors employ a total of five econometric models to ensure robustness of their 
results, including OLS with fixed and random effects. They control for per capita 
income, budget balance and population and use time effects in all, and country effects in 
some, of their specifications. They find a statistically significant relationship between 
decentralization and expenditure ratios.  Because, they assert, “implicit in the argument 
that decentralization can increase allocative efficiency is the implication that 
decentralization is likely to alter the composition of public expenditures” (Arze del 
Granado et al. 2005: p. 2), they concur with Faguet (2004) and conclude in favor of the 
potential of decentralization to enhance preference matching. 
Akin et al. (2005) take a slightly different tack. They attempt to provide a deeper 
understanding of spending allocations within the health sector after a decentralization 
reform occurred in Uganda. The authors postulate a model in which users undervalue 
public-type health goods such as family planning, health education, immunization and 
infectious disease control. Because local governments will be more responsive to the 
preferences revealed by their residents for private-type health goods, the authors posit 
that districts will under-provide public-type health care and ignore spillover effects on 
neighboring regions if they are not under the same jurisdiction.  
Akin et al.’s theory is borne out in the district-level data they examine from Uganda. 
They find, after controlling for per capita income in a fixed effects model, that 
decentralization is associated with higher budgeting of private-type health goods. 
Because their main empirical strategy compares districts that decentralized earlier to 
those that decentralized later, the authors attempt to provide validation that the groups 
did not differ systematically. Moreover, Akin et al. also cite evidence in favor of 
crowding-out effects – districts whose neighbors budget higher amounts on public-type 
goods budget less on such goods themselves. On the basis of this evidence, Akin et al. 
(2005: p.3) pessimistically call for “A reappraisal of the central government’s role in 
providing public goods in developing countries”.  
What is interesting, however, is that their argument is not one against the preference 
matching effects of decentralization per se, as they assume local governments are indeed 
responding to local inclinations in Uganda. Rather, their pessimism arises from the result 
of the responsiveness versus spillover effects trade-off. The Oates Decentralization 
Theorem (1972) suggests that devolution is superior only so long as there are no 
spillover effects. In the presence of spillover effects, the theoretical prediction for 
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preference matching of decentralization is ambiguous or even negative (Besley and 
Coate 2003; Bardhan and Mookherjee 1998).  
The papers with Less Credible empirical designs take Akin et al.’s pessimism even 
further. Schwartz et al. (2002), for instance, examine the trends in spending composition 
of health services in 1600 regions in the Philippines to show, like Akin et al., a shift in 
local spending composition from public-type health services to private-type curative 
health care. Along a similar vein, Hasnain (2008) considers budget allocation trends in 
Pakistan’s province of Punjab and reports that decentralized local governments are 
prioritizing allocations for infrastructure over those for health and education. And in 
sharp contrast to all of the studies above, Frienkman and Plekhanov (2009) do not find a 
change in allocation patterns after decentralization in Russia at all. The authors use a 
between effects model on cross-sectional data to conclude that fiscal decentralization is 
not significantly associated with an investment in education inputs.  
So what, if anything, can we take away from this short review of the evidence of 
decentralization’s ability to enhance preference matching? The literature in this theme is 
small, and the number of high quality contributions is even smaller. But studies across 
the quality distinctions appear to mostly concur that decentralization changes the patterns 
of local spending. On the other hand, whether or not these changes are responsive to 
local needs is an area where there is less agreement. While the evidence appears 
somewhat encouraging for enhanced preference matching in education, contributions in 
the area of health are decidedly pessimistic due both to a lack of visible change in 
allocation patterns and the possibility of externalities in the area.  
  
Table 3: Selected Empirical Evidence of Preference Matching Source: Cited articles
No. Author (Date)
Country of 
Study
Date 
Implemented
Programme 
Description
Method of 
Analysis Sample
Measure/s of 
Decentralization Results
Identification 
Strategy No.
Health
1 Faguet (2004); 
Faguet (2012); 
Faguet and 
Sanchez (2008)
Bolivia 1994 Increase in devolved funds to 
LG, responsibility for public 
services, establishment of 
oversight committees
OLS using a fixed 
effects model
Universe of 311 
regions over 1987 - 
2007
▪ Binary measure of before 
and after D implementation 
▪ Investment in health did not change 
significantly post D
Strongly Credible 1
2 Skoufias et al 
(2011)
Indonesia 1999 Increase in devolved funds to 
LG, responsibility for public 
services. In 2005, direct 
election of local government
Difference in 
differences
200 out of 400 districts 
during 2001 to 2006
▪ Binary measure of election 
date
▪ Overall public expenditure increased 
post D
▪ No significant change in health 
spending post D
Strongly Credible 2
3 Akin et al (2005) Uganda 1993 - 1994 Fiscal decentralization, with 
rule-based unconditional 
grants given to regions 
OLS using a fixed 
effects model
30 out of 45 regions 
during 1995 - 1998
▪ Years since unconditional 
grant given to LG
▪ Proportion of LG 
expenditure financed by LG 
revenues
▪ Share of allocation to health decreased 
in local budgets, esp. in preventive and 
primary health care areas
▪ Some evidence of spillover, where 
neighbours of high health spending 
districts have lower health spending
Somewhat Credible 3
4 Arze del Granado 
et al (2005)
Cross-country Various Various Various including 
OLS using fixed 
and random, also 
QMLE models
45 developed and 
developing countries - 
Unbalanced panel over 
1973 - 2000
▪ Share of LG expenditure in 
total government 
expenditure
▪ Higher D associated with higher 
proportion of spending on health and 
education
Somewhat Credible 4
5 Hasnain (2008) Pakistan 2001 Limited financial devolution 
but implementation of rule-
based transfers, 
responsibility for public 
services, political devolution
Allocation trend 
analysis
33 out of 35 districts in 
Punjab over 2006-
2007
▪ Budget allocations to 
sectors
▪ Relative size of LG spend 
on sector
▪ LG spend focused on infrastructure and 
away from health
▪ Provinces driving health interventions, 
providing incentives to shift away 
budgets
Less Credible 5
6 Schwartz et al 
(2002)
Philippines 1991 Increase in devolved funds to 
LG, responsibility for public 
services
Spending trend 
analysis
1600 LG - period 
includes 4 yrs before 
and 6 yrs after
▪ Binary measure of before 
and after D implementation 
▪ Greater % spend allocated to health 
post D
▪ Higher spend on private health goods, 
explained by expenses arising from 
devolution of hospitals
Less Credible 6
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Education
7 Faguet (2004); 
Faguet (2012); 
Faguet and 
Sanchez (2008)
Bolivia 1994 Increase in devolved funds to 
LG, responsibility for public 
services, establishment of 
oversight committees
OLS using a fixed 
effects model
Universe of 311 
regions over 1987 - 
2007
▪ Binary measure of before 
and after D implementation 
▪ Investment in education increases 
significantly post D
▪ Investment increases are associated 
with illiteracy levels
Strongly Credible 7
8 Skoufias et al 
(2011)
Indonesia 1999 Increase in devolved funds to 
LG, responsibility for public 
services. In 2005, direct 
election of local government
Difference in 
differences
200 out of 400 districts 
during 2001 to 2006
▪ Binary measure of election 
date
▪ Overall public expenditure increased 
post D
▪ Increase in spending on education post 
D
Strongly Credible 8
9 Arze del Granado 
et al (2005)
Cross-country Various Various Various including 
OLS using fixed 
and random, also 
QMLE models
45 developed and 
developing countries - 
Unbalanced panel over 
1973 - 2000
▪ Share of LG expenditure in 
total government 
expenditure
▪ Higher D associated with higher 
proportion of spending on health and 
education
Somewhat Credible 9
10 Freinkman and 
Plekhanov (2009)
Russia Phased beginning in 
1994
Increased fiscal powers with 
rule-based transfers, 
responsibility for public 
services
OLS using a 
between effects 
model
73 out of 83 regions, 
with data collection in 
2003
▪ Share of LG education 
expenditure financed by own 
revenue
▪ Type of decentralization 
arrangement
▪ No significant impact on inputs Less Credible 10
11 Hasnain (2008) Pakistan 2001 Limited financial devolution 
but implementation of rule-
based transfers, 
responsibility for public 
services, political devolution
Allocation trend 
analysis
33 out of 35 districts in 
Punjab over 2006-
2007
▪ Budget allocations to 
sectors
▪ Relative size of LG spend 
on sector
▪ LG spend focused on infrastructure and 
away from education
▪ Provinces driving education 
interventions, providing incentives to shift 
away budgets
Less Credible 11
Notes
PM: Allocative Efficiency
TE: Technical Efficiency
D: Decentralization
LG: Local Government
 3.2 Technical Efficiency 
The body of work on the ability of decentralization to enhance technical efficiency in 
the delivery of education and health fortunately is much larger than that found in the 
previous theme. Strikingly, it is also more rigorous, and fairly optimistic of the potential 
of decentralization to improve service delivery. 
 
3.2.1 Health  
The lone paper with a Strongly Credible empirical strategy in this sub-category, for 
instance, provides the first piece of evidence strongly in favor of decentralization’s 
ability to enhance technical efficiency in health delivery.   
Uchimura and Jutting (2009) examine the interesting case of China, a country that 
has had consistently high levels of spending decentralization, but a growing 
recentralization of revenue decisions since 1994. Improving on previous studies that use 
only province-level data, Uchimura and Jutting employ data from counties in 26 
provinces over a seven year period. Counties in China have responsibility for 
implementing health programs. However, local government officials are elected through 
parties, not the adult franchise, which limits political accountability of officials to 
citizens.  
The authors determine the statistical relationship between two measures of county-
level fiscal decentralization and the outcome of provincial infant mortality rates (IMR), 
while controlling for key health production function elements such as illiteracy rates, 
fertility rates and per capita income. The main specification includes fixed effects. 
Finding statistically significant and negative coefficients in most of the models tested, 
the authors conclude that counties in more fiscally decentralized provinces have lower 
IMR. Interactions between their two measures of decentralization – own expenditure 
financed and proportion of provincial expenditure - are also positive. This suggests to the 
authors that IMRs are lower in provinces not only where fiscal capacity is strengthened, 
but also where counties and provinces have a functional transfer system in place.     
Two contributions from the group with Somewhat Credible evidence are also 
positive. In a study quite similar to the above, Asfaw et al. (2007) consider empirical 
evidence on rural infant mortality rates from India. Decentralization in India has a long 
history. But, it took its current form with the passing of the 1989 Panchayat Raj bill and 
later constitutional amendments in the early 1990s that devolved power to the traditional 
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village organizations or Panchayats. Panchayats now form a part of the local 
government, hold elections, and bear responsibility for health and education delivery. 
Evidence suggests, however, that different states have followed differing models of 
devolution, making comparative analysis of the reform difficult. 
 Nonetheless, Asfaw et al. attempt to estimate the role of devolution in affecting the 
outcome of rural infant mortality rates using data from 14 states over seven years. In 
order to improve the measure of fiscal decentralization, the authors use factor analysis of 
three different indicators to build a decentralization index, including a Panchayat’s share 
in total expenditure, Panchayat expenditure per rural population and share of 
Panychayat’s own revenue in Panychayat’s expenditure. Controls are included for per 
capita income of state, percentage share of literate women, and an index of political 
decentralization (constructed from data on voter turnout, women’s participation in polls 
and number of polling stations). Notably absent though are important health production 
function components such as fertility.  
The authors demonstrate a statistically significant and negative relationship between 
decentralization and IMR in both their random and fixed effects models, but not in the 
between-effects model. Asfaw et al. (2007) conclude that having an above average 
decentralization index is associated with a 17.16% reduction as compared to states with 
below average fiscal decentralization scores. The results hold when the measure of 
decentralization is altered, when indices are made continuous measures and also when 
two year averages of IMR are used.   
The final positive single country study we review here is due to Habibi et al. (2003) 
who consider devolution of basic health and education (see also next section) services in 
Argentina. In their paper, Habibi et al. use nationwide data from over a 25 year period to 
examine the relationship between two measures of fiscal decentralization and the infant 
mortality rate, while controlling for per capita income, per capita expenditure and the 
number of public sector employees. The authors present results from three models, 
including OLS, GLS and OLS with fixed effects, finding a significant and negative 
relationship between the parameters of interest. On the basis of these findings, the 
authors conclude that devolution can have positive effects on human development, 
especially when there is greater tax accountability in a province.  
Less optimistically, Inchauste (2009) reports Bolivian evidence from the first half of 
the 2000s in the context of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, which 
directed resources saved from repayment of debt to local governments based on poverty 
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levels. Although she shows that there has been increased investment in both health and 
education, she does not find a significant association between the number of poor in a 
municipality and HIPC transfers, and argues that HIPC funds have not been targeted 
well.  
Using a random effects model, Inchauste also examines the relationship between the 
change in health spending and (1) the change in share of unattended illnesses and (2) the 
unattended cases of respiratory diseases, finding a significant decline in the former and 
no significant change in the latter. The author controls for several socio-economic factors 
such as family size and illiteracy. But the short time period studied presents two 
important shortcomings: (1) the entire sample is in the post-decentralization period, and 
(2) it rules out the use of municipal fixed effects, which implies that her results may 
suffer from endogeneity despite the controls employed. Inchauste argues that there has 
been a lack of improvement in social indicators based on this mixed result, as well as on 
the results on education which we discuss in the next section. But the lack of pre-reform 
data imply that her results may say more about administration of the HIPC initiative than 
about decentralization per se. 
What cross-country evidence do we have of associations of decentralization and 
health service delivery? Two notable studies over the past decade investigate the impact 
of decentralization on health service delivery, finding somewhat mixed results that 
appear to depend crucially on the level of development of a nation.  
In an oft-cited paper, Robalino et al. (2001) perform a cross-country data regression, 
using IMR as the dependent variable, fiscal decentralization as the independent variable 
and a set of controls for GDP per capita and institutional capacity variables such as 
corruption, ethno-linguistic fractionalization and political rights. Like several other 
papers in this section, however, the authors miss out on controlling for fertility, which 
scholars argue is a key determinant of IMR (Treisman 2007). Their sample, though not 
expressly given in their paper, comprises between 45-70 low and high income countries 
and they rely on data from GFS.  
Robalino et al.’s fixed effects model yields a significant and negative relationship 
between the key measures of interest. In their basic model, if a country with a GDP per 
capita of USD 2000 increases its share of expenditures managed by local governments 
by 10%, this would be associated with a 3.6% decrease in mortality rates. Robalino et al. 
also find evidence to show that the benefits associated with fiscal decentralization may 
have a U shaped curve with respect to GDP per capita, implying that countries with low 
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and high incomes are more likely to benefit from the reform than middle income 
countries. They conclude that decentralization benefits are “particularly important for 
poor countries” (Robalino et al. 2001: p. 11).    
According to Khalegian (2004), on other hand, the benefit curve is L shaped for 
immunization. Using data on 140 low and middle income countries over 18 years, he 
conducts a cross-country regression of a measure of decentralization against 
immunization rates against measles and diphtheria. Unlike other papers in this area, 
Khalegian uses a political, not a fiscal measure of decentralization, sourced primarily 
from the Database of Political Institutions. Here, decentralization is measured as a binary 
variable, indicating whether or not local governments have authority for taxing, spending 
and regulation although measures of fiscal decentralization from GFS are also employed 
in the regression. The typical socio-economic controls for GDP per capita, population 
density, and illiteracy are included, in addition to measures of institutional quality, ethnic 
conflict and fractionalization, and income inequality.  
The author notes positive and significant coefficients for lower income decentralized 
countries in his main specification which uses between effects and time dummies – 
decentralization is associated with 8.8% and 8.3% increase in diphtheria and measles 
coverage, respectively. In middle income countries, however, this reverses and 
decentralization is associated with a decrease in diphtheria and measles coverage of 
4.9% and 5.5% respectively.  Analysis indicates that the turning point is per capita GDP 
of 1400 (in 1995 USD), after which a negative relationship stabilizes.  
Khalegian’s outlook based on these results is mixed with regards to decentralization 
– after exploring some channels, he proposes that the difference between the results seen 
in lower and middle income countries can be attributed to the possibility that poorer 
countries decentralize less fully than middle income ones. This implies that were 
complete devolution to occur, we would see a negative impact on immunization. The 
author uses this to encourage continued central government support of health initiatives.  
In the Less Credible category, Treisman (2002) uses OLS regression on cross-
sectional multi-country data to show that decentralization’s effects may be sensitive to 
the income level of a country. Using data on 166 countries, Treisman explores how 
having constitutional sub-national authority relates to two indicators of health care 
performance – the share of infants inoculated for diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis, and 
the share of population for which 20 essential drugs are available and affordable. Once 
an extensive set of socio-economic controls are added, the paper’s findings are not 
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significant for sub-national authority, although greater electoral accountability is 
correlated with better access to medicines. In his analysis, nations with per capita GNP 
greater than USD 5000 have worse service delivery performance than their counterparts 
with lower per capita GNP.  
In sum, while the body of scholarship in this sub-category is larger than that in 
preference matching, it is still rather thin. Moreover, high credibility contributions are 
also rare. That said, the three country studies of Strongly Credible or Somewhat Credible 
empirical strategies all demonstrate the ability of health decentralization to have a 
positive influence on infant mortality rates. The same is not necessarily true for 
immunization, although we are forced to draw this conclusion on the basis of two cross-
country studies with less convincing methodologies. 
 
3.2.2 Education  
Amongst studies of education, two papers of high quality set the stage for prevalent 
optimism. In the first, Galiani et al. (2008) examine decentralization in Argentina by 
comparing changes in student test scores in secondary schools that have always been 
under provincial control to changes in schools that were under federal control until the 
1991 reform. Like many other Latin American countries, Argentina undertook 
devolution to provinces as part of a broader structural reform, first devolving 
responsibility for pre-schools and primary schools, and then undertaking the same 
reform for secondary schools. Provinces now have authority over personnel and 
budgeting decisions, while schools are largely responsible for textbook selection and 
teaching methods.   
Galiani et al. perform a difference in differences estimation while controlling for 
provincial per capita, unemployment and fiscal deficits. Using average school test scores 
from a sample of students tested in almost 99% of the secondary school universe, they 
compare the change in outcomes in those schools that were decentralized to changes in 
those schools that were always provincial. Because the impact on scores is unlikely to be 
immediate, the authors estimate the impact of exposure to decentralized schools for up to 
five years by cohort. Their results show a positive association between decentralization 
and Mathematics and Spanish scores - after five years, a 4.9% and 6.9% increase 
compared to the mean, respectively. The analysis in the paper does not include any 
validation of parallel trends, which is the key identifying assumption of a difference in 
differences estimation - however, the authors do use matching techniques to demonstrate 
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that the results do not change when looking at treatment and control groups with similar 
characteristics.    
In a comparable paper with a solid methodological design, Faguet and Sánchez 
(2008) use changes in enrolment rates in state schools as the measure of student 
achievement in order to evaluate the impact of decentralization on service delivery in 
Colombia. They analyze the impact of a phased decentralization reform in the country, 
which not only left local governments responsible for provision of public services but 
also provided them increased fiscal powers to fulfill this responsibility.  
 Their empirical strategy is deemed Strongly Credible for a number of reasons. First, 
the authors, like some of the other papers we review in this theme, overcome the 
challenges of measuring decentralization by using three different indicators. This reduces 
the possibility that results are driven primarily by choice of measure. Second, they 
include relevant controls for resources that may influence school attendance rates 
independently, in addition to using many of the standard local government level controls 
for wealth and unemployment, limiting the possibility of omitted variable bias. Finally, 
in order to address the possibility of reverse causality, i.e. an increase in enrolment rates 
causing the increase in local government spending, the authors instrument for 
decentralization using t-1 and t-2 lagged local per capita tax revenues. These instruments 
should be correlated to the decentralization ratio of own resources to total expenditure, 
but are unlikely to influence increases in student attendance directly. 
Using both OLS and IV, they find that measures of decentralization have a 
significant and positive correlation with changes in student enrolment, with the effects 
being larger for smaller municipalities.  
The larger Somewhat Credible category fuels further enthusiasm for decentralized 
education delivery. In a paper discussed earlier under Health Technical Efficiency, 
Habibi et al. (2003) report the empirical relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
the ratio of students enrolled in secondary school per 1000 primary students. Using 
Argentine data from 1970-1994 in a fixed effects model, the authors find that their 
measure of decentralization - own resources to total resources - has a positive and 
significant association with their measure of education output.    
Freinkman and Plenakanov’s (2009) examination of the impact of fiscal 
decentralization on student scores in Russia presents the only comparison of preference 
matching and technical efficiency of decentralization that we have come across in this 
review. The authors evaluate the statistical relationship between test scores of students 
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from 73 regions in Russia tested in 2004 and 2005 and fiscal decentralization of a region. 
The 1994 reforms passed responsibility of key public services to local governments, 
giving them control over 80% of social spending on health and education. The authors 
exploit regional variances to estimate the impact of decentralization in a between effects 
model, employing many of the conventional controls, but also including one for initial 
stock of inputs. Their data on household factors, however, is fairly limited. 
Despite this, their findings are rather interesting – they find that the change in 
spending on education was marginal with no significant impact of decentralization 
variables on computers, pre-school years or student teacher ratios. However, the 
relationship between student outcomes, as measured by an average of Language and 
Mathematics test scores, and decentralization is consistently positive in all of their 
specifications. A 10 percentage point increase in own revenues of municipalities is 
significantly correlated with 30 percent of one standard deviation improvement in 
secondary school exam scores. Taken together, they propose that their results are 
consistent with a technical efficiency argument arising from accountability and local 
official incentives, rather than allocative efficiency of increased inputs into the education 
production process.  
Aslam and Yilmaz (2011) are similarly positive about decentralization, and support 
their arguments with analysis conducted on a unique dataset collected from 183 
randomly selected villages in 5 purposively chosen districts in Pakistan. Pakistan 
embarked on an ambitious decentralization program in 2001, which left local 
governments responsible for basic service delivery, although many scholars note that 
devolution over fiscal and personnel management was limited.  
The authors construct a measure of education service delivery by collecting 
retrospective data from villagers on changes in capital improvements, school 
maintenance and education services during the period 1995 to 2007. They validate this 
data on historical changes through on-site documentation. They then regress a composite 
measure of these indicators on a dummy variable for decentralization using a fixed 
effects model, to find that provision of education increased dramatically after the 
introduction of the decentralization reform. Of some worry, however, are data limitations 
due to which the only control they can include is an estimate of village population.  
Can we conclude that decentralization enhances technical efficiency in education 
based on the above? Inchauste (2009) would disagree. Her examination of the 
relationship between changes in education allocations, and children not attending school 
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and un-enrolled children in Bolivia, shows limited support for devolution. Using data 
over a slightly longer period than her analysis of health indicators (see above), her results 
for funds made available to local governments through the HIPC initiative are again 
mixed. She finds that increases in education transfers were associated with a decrease in 
children not attending school in the 1999-2002 period, but an increase in unenrolled 
children in 2002-2005. The impact of education spending in both periods, and on other 
intermediate education indicators, is not significant.     
The lower quality evidence, primarily simple regression analysis on cross-sectional 
data, is likewise mixed. Some of the contributions, nonetheless, do present noteworthy 
findings. One example is Di Gropello (2002), which shows conflicting results on the 
impact of municipality level and school level devolution on student test scores in Chile. 
Using an education production function design for testing conducted in 1996, Di 
Gropello regresses the outcome of student test scores on a measure of fiscal 
decentralization, school level parameters of autonomy and participation, and some 
controls commonly found in the education economics literature. Both devolved wage 
incentives and training expenditure at the municipal level are associated with higher test 
scores, while greater financial autonomy as measured by municipal own funds spent on 
education to total funds spent on education is not. At the school level, Di Gropello finds 
that coefficients of involvement in financial and pedagogical decision-making are 
significant and positively associated with student test scores.  
By contrast, Lockheed and Zhao (1993)’s review from the Philippines is decisively 
negative. By comparing national, private and municipal or baranguay-run schools and 
controlling for socio-economic background, they find no significant difference in 
attitudes or achievement in science or mathematics. They argue that this is due to little 
actual control and resources being devolved to local schools, presenting the “empty 
opportunity of decentralization” in the country. Treisman (2002) is equally pessimistic in 
the only cross-country evidence we review in this sub-category. He finds that the 
presence of constitutional autonomy and electoral accountability at the local level were 
both associated with a higher level of youth illiteracy in data from up to 166 nations. In 
line with his findings in the area of health, the negative associations he reports are 
stronger for countries with GNP per capita greater than USD 5,000.    
In summary, this sub-category is not only larger than the previous ones, but also 
significantly more positive about decentralization’s effects, especially when adjusted for 
quality of evidence. Although the marginal increase in number of contributions comes 
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from studies falling in the middle quality distinction, they are almost unanimous in their 
support of decentralization’s ability to enhance both the quality and quantity of 
education. 
 
3.2.3 School-Based Management (SBM)  
As indicated by a number of recent reviews, the literature in this category has made 
considerable progress. We provide a basic examination of the most important pieces of 
works in this literature below, but also refer readers to Galiani and Perez-Truglia (2011); 
Bruns et al (2011); and Barrera-Osorio et al. (2009) for more comprehensive reviews5. 
What does ‘gold standard’ evidence tell us about the effectiveness of SBM reforms? 
Two recent experimental contributions, and the only ones to be categorized as having 
Very Strongly Credible research designs in our review, investigate SBM’s potential in 
enhancing student attainment. They yield contradictory findings. 
The more optimistic evidence comes from Duflo et al.’s (2007) paper on a 
randomized control trial in Western Kenya. The trial tested a number of interventions on 
a total of 210 primary schools, one of which involved an SBM component that 
empowered school councils to hire and monitor contract teachers. Duflo et al. compare 
the SBM groups to their counterparts in the control group, to show that students in the 
treatment cell scored 0.18 and 0.24 standard deviations higher in Mathematics and 
Language than their non-treated counterparts two years following the intervention.  
On the other hand, Glewwe and Maiga (2011) present less optimistic experimental 
results. They examine a randomized trial in Madagascar, which involved management 
reforms at three levels – district, sub-district and school. In a sample of 30 districts, sub-
districts and schools were randomly sorted into treatment and control groups. Glewwe 
and Maiga document some school improvements in the first six months, but by the end 
of two years find no discernible impact on aggregated test scores. They conclude not 
against the reform per se, arguing instead that results may be driven by the short time 
since intervention. Their conclusion is consistent with suggestions in the SBM literature 
from the US that reforms may take up to five years to affect student test scores (see 
Borman et a. 2003).  
                                                 
5 For good reviews of this literature from developed countries, see Summers and Johnson (1994) and 
Borman et al. (2003). See also a related and relatively more rigorous literature on charter and grant-
maintained schools from the US and UK respectively e.g. Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011) and Clark (2009) 
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The four studies that rely on the quasi-experimental technique of difference in 
differences, on the other hand, are unanimously favorable. The former two we classify 
under the Strongly Credible quality distinction, while the latter two are deemed to have 
Somewhat Credible identification strategies primarily as a result of challenges they face 
with the key parallel trend assumption required in a through DID analysis.  
The strongest paper of this type is due to Gertler et al. (2011), who consider the AGE 
(Apoyo a la Gestión Escolar) intervention from Mexico. AGE is an SBM reform that 
provides training and small grants to parent associations in disadvantaged schools to 
invest in infrastructure and materials. Gertler et al. exploit the phased implementation of 
the AGE program to achieve identification, comparing schools that adopted AGE earlier 
to those that adopted it later.   
The key concern is if these two groups differed systematically from each other, and 
these differences were correlated with school performance. To address this, the authors 
first provide proof that trends in both early and late adopters were parallel. They contend 
that because many of the unobservable factors that confound identification tend to be 
fixed over time, difference in differences is an appropriate strategy that allows the 
elimination of not only pre-treatment differences, but also all other time invariant 
differences between the treated and control groups. To further limit chances of 
endogeneity, the authors use a vector of relevant time-varying school characteristics. 
Their analysis suggests that participation in the AGE program is associated with a 
0.6 and 0.4 percentage point reduction in failure and repetition rates, respectively. This 
translates to a 4% and 5.4% decrease in these respective indicators. The authors find no 
significant association between AGE and intra-year drop-out rates. Through qualitative 
research, the paper also suggests that the channel for improvement is the increased 
participation of parents in decision-making.  
In the second study of this type, Skoufias and Shapiro (2006) also use a difference in 
differences method but combine it with a matching technique to examine a different 
intervention from Mexico. They consider the PEC (Programa Escuelas de Calidad) 
program, another SBM type reform which provides annual grants to disadvantaged 
schools to improve education quality. The program gave up to a five-year USD 15k 
grant to the 20,000 schools, or 10% of the schooling system, that volunteered to 
participate. Like other SBM reforms, school councils participated in the design, 
implementation and monitoring of the improvement plans that the grants financed.  
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The authors use data for approximately 75,000 schools to first conduct a simpler 
OLS, and then a much improved difference in differences with matching estimation, to 
address concerns of lack of counterfactual data, and self-selection. Their use of 
propensity score matching attempts to correct for self-selection by allowing comparison 
of PEC and non-PEC schools that are as similar as possible. This similarity is captured 
by an index or propensity score that is based on observable characteristics of schools. In 
addition, the authors control for a variety of school and municipal characteristics.  
Employing this mix of methods, they find that PEC participation is significantly 
associated with a 0.24, 0.24 and 0.31 reduction in dropout, failure and repetition rate, 
respectively. The impact, it should be noted, is marginal and represents a 6% to 8% 
reduction relative to the baseline means. Due to data limitations, the authors do not 
provide pre-intervention trend validation. 
Paes de Barros and Mendonca (1998)’s study of the three key SBM changes in 
Brazil of financial autonomy of schools, head teacher election and establishment of 
school councils has similar limitations where lack of pre-implementation trend validation 
is concerned. Using one of the first difference in differences methodologies seen in the 
field, Paes de Barros and Mendonca examine changes in a series of outputs by using data 
from education censuses during the 1981-1993 period. Their methodology relies on 
estimating, over this period of time, the change in states that received an innovation 
against the change in groups that did not receive an innovation. To address time-varying 
characteristics, the authors include a set of controls for per capita income and indicators 
of teacher quality.  
  Their findings suggest that financial autonomy is associated with a significant drop 
in repetition rates. Similarly positive trends are evident when the authors examine mean 
level lags in grades attended and share of children with lag – the former is negatively and 
significantly associated with school financial autonomy and the presence of school 
councils, while the latter has a negative and significant correlation with school council 
presence only. To perform their analysis, however, Paes de Barros and Mendonca use 
state-level averages, which may mask important variation at lower levels of government.  
Also supportive is the only investigation from Asia that we review in this sub-
category. In a recent World Bank working paper, Khattri et al (2010) evaluate the impact 
of school-based management reforms implemented in 2003 in 23 districts in the 
Philippines. The program, sponsored by the World Bank, involved providing training to 
principals and parents in designing School Improvement Plans, in addition to direct 
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funding for the improvements planned. Implementation of the program was in three 
phases, with early selection based primarily on a perception of school capability.  
Using data from the period 2003 to 2005, Khattri et al. compare the test score 
performance of students in schools that implemented the intervention in the first phase to 
those that implemented the intervention in a later phase. Due to the nature of the 
implementation strategy, however, the authors note chances of bias. These chances are 
highlighted by their analysis of pre-intervention trends, which shows that attainment 
trends in the treatment and comparison groups were not similar. To mitigate this 
concern, Khattri et al. combine their DID strategy with matching. However, they 
concede that their analysis may be more useful for noting trends as they “cannot make 
any claims of causality” (p. 11). 
In comparison to the control group, the treatment group showed a 1.45 percentage 
point improvement in overall student attainment. For the subjects of Science, English 
and Mathematics, the improvements were 1.45, 1.32 and 1.88 percentage points, 
respectively.  
In contrast to the above papers, the rest of the Somewhat Credible identification 
strategy category has mixed findings. The two cross-country studies on SBM are 
negative. Gunnarsson et al. (2009) evaluate the effects of School-Based Management 
reforms in 10 Latin American countries. School autonomy and participation, two 
indicators that have been popularly used by many other authors working on SBM, are 
measured for the various countries using survey data from 1997 and then quantified 
using factor analysis. The authors support their OLS analysis by instrumenting for 
autonomy and participation using principal attributes and legal structure. 
After first noting the variation in autonomy and participation across countries, they 
find a negative and significant association between school autonomy and test scores. 
They do, however, find a positive relationship of test scores with parental participation. 
That said, Barrera Osorio et al. (2009) indicate that Gunnarsson et al.’s instruments are 
not necessarily solid. Good instruments are correlated with the endogenous variable, in 
this instance autonomy, but have no effect on the dependent variable except through the 
endogenous variable. However, of concern is the fact that both principal attributes and 
legal structures can plausibly have an independent impact on attainment. 
 The second cross-country study comes from a recent contribution by Hanushek et al. 
(2011) who use data from four waves of PISA test scores to establish the relationship 
between student achievement and autonomy in curricular, personnel and budgeting 
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areas. Their dataset contains test scores and background data on 1 million students from 
42 countries, of which 25 are classified as high income nations. 
Using a two way fixed effects model and controlling for a variety of family and 
school characteristics, Hanushek et al. find the relationship between the parameters of 
interest to be negative, albeit heterogeneous across countries based on income levels. A 
disaggregated analysis suggests that school autonomy is related to positive outcomes in 
developed and high-performing nations, but to negative ones in developing and low-
performing nations. The authors perform a number of robustness checks, including one 
to address the concern of reverse causality – they test whether changes in autonomy in 
nations are predicted by previous PISA scores, and find they are not. 
Hanushek et al.’s study suggests that understanding when SBM can be effective is 
critical. King and Ozler (2000)’s older paper on Nicaragua’s reform provides an 
interesting answer to this question by arguing that it is de facto and not de jure school 
autonomy that improves student performance. Nicaragua’s school autonomy intervention 
was implemented in 1991 and allowed Nicaraguan schools to sign contracts with the 
Ministry of Education to become autonomous. Autonomous schools were meant to work 
through school councils, which had de jure control to hire and fire teachers, manage 
school budgets and maintain infrastructure.   
King and Ozler use a number of models to estimate the impact of both de jure 
autonomy measured by the signing of a contract, and de facto autonomy measured by 
factor analysis of teacher’s responses. In their main specification, the authors rely on an 
extended production function on cross-sectional data. They attempt to mitigate 
challenges arising from both high student attrition in their sample and endogenous 
implementation of the reform, the former through estimation of a Heckman selection 
model and the latter through the use of a matching technique and analysis of panel data 
available for a smaller sample base. Their matched comparison design strategy compares 
similar treated and non-treated schools to show that de facto autonomy is associated with 
higher test scores in Mathematics and Spanish, but de jure autonomy has no significant 
impact. The school fixed effect strategy on the smaller sample yields consistent findings.  
Parker (2005) provides more support for the case of the Nicaraguan autonomy 
reform, using more nationally representative data that she contends is less prone to 
student attrition bias than King and Ozler’s (2000) analysis. To mitigate the self-
selection bias that exists in her analysis, Parker also uses propensity score matching to 
compare autonomous and centralized schools. Her results are mixed – after controlling 
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for the standard components of an education production function, she finds that third 
graders in autonomous schools scored significantly higher than their counterparts in 
centralized schools in Mathematics. But for sixth graders the effect is negative for 
Mathematics, and in neither case are results significant for Spanish.   
Also relying on cross-sectional analysis, Jimenez and Sawada (1999) study EDUCO, 
perhaps the most celebrated case of SBM, and find no significant difference in test 
scores. EDUCO (Educación con Participación de la Comunidad) was first implemented 
in 1991 and has served as a model for many of the community-run schools in the Latin 
American region. The program established community schools to enhance access in 
rural areas in El Salvador following the end of civil war. EDUCO schools are run by 
councils consisting of elected community members called Associations for Community 
Education (ACE), which have considerable authority in hiring/firing teachers, setting 
school curriculum and monitoring school performance.    
The authors employ one of the first education production functions in the field to 
assess the impact of decentralization on student test scores, albeit for a fairly small 
sample of 600 students tested in 1996. To address endogenous program placement, 
Jimenez and Sawada use a Heckman two-stage procedure, exploiting the government 
priorization formula as an instrument. They find no significant difference in test scores 
between traditional and EDUCO students. Given that EDUCO students come from 
disadvantaged backgrounds, the authors consider this a positive result. They also find 
evidence that student absenteeism is lower in EDUCO schools. 
In a more recent paper, Sawada and Ragatz (2005) use propensity score matching on 
the same dataset, and still find no impact on student test scores. They do, however, report 
evidence of significantly lower teacher absenteeism in EDUCO schools. The authors 
propose that lower absenteeism arises as the result of improved community monitoring, 
and the authority of councils to hire/ fire teachers. Evidence shows that ACEs of 
EDUCO schools use incentives for renewable contracts to motivate this outcome among 
teachers. Their finding is supported by other studies that compare absenteeism rates of 
permanent and contract teachers, especially in India, to show that the community 
monitoring aspect is critical in enhancing outcomes (see for example Ramachandran et 
al. 2005; Banerjee and Duflo 2006). 
Di Gropello and Marshall (2005) employ a methodology similar to Jimenez and 
Sawada (1999) to assess the impact of participating in a PROHECO (Proyecto 
Hondureño de Educación Comunitaria) community school in Honduras. PROHECO 
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schools were first established in 1999 in order to enhance primary school access in rural 
areas. Unlike more traditional schools, they are run almost entirely by school councils 
which are legal entities that set budgets, maintain school infrastructure and perform key 
personnel management functions including hiring, monitoring and paying. 
The authors use a Heckman selection correction model to attempt to address 
endogeneity in placement of PROHECO schools into areas where parental demand is 
low and other community-level problems exist which would otherwise underestimate the 
benefits of participation. The two-step Heckit model works by first estimating a probit 
equation to predict participation in a PROHECO school based on exogenous factors, and 
then by using this probability factor in regressions against the output of drop-out rates to 
mitigate self-selection bias. As instruments, Di Gropello and Marshall (2005) use the 
presence of potable water and other community services. The authors also control for the 
usual education production function factors. Their results point to marginally lower 
dropout and repetition rates in SBM schools. Validity of their findings, however, may 
have been compromised due to inconsistent data collection as pointed out by the authors. 
Moreover, as Gertler et al (2007: p. 20) note, “because services that affect access might 
also affect learning, these instruments are not particularly convincing.” 
 The only study in this category with a Less Credible identification method is one 
from Argentina, which nonetheless demonstrates findings of interest. Eskeland and 
Filmer (2007) perform a simple OLS regression using an expanded education production 
function to investigate the impact of an education devolution reform that left many key 
education decisions decentralized to the municipal and school level. Exploiting cross-
sectional data containing test scores of over 24,000 6th and 7th grade students across the 
nation, the authors present one of the first attempts to explore the interdependent nature 
of autonomy and participation by using an interaction model. Eskeland and Filmer find 
that autonomy is significantly associated with student test scores in Mathematics, but not 
in Language. They contend that participation has no independent effect on scores, but 
that its interaction with autonomy is positive and significant. 
In summary, studies with credible identification strategies appear to consistently 
support school decentralization’s ability to improve repetition, failure and even drop-out 
rates. Results on student test scores, however, are mixed in both higher quality and 
medium quality evidence. Interestingly, authors have as a consequence tried to consider 
when SBM may be successful. This effort has yielded diverse results suggesting efficacy 
particularly in developed countries, or in schools with de facto autonomy, or even in the 
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presence of both autonomy and participation together. The scholarship on this latter 
aspect, however, is too small to draw firmer conclusions. 
  
Table 4: Selected Empirical Evidence of Technical Efficiency Source: Cited articles
No. Author (Date)
Country of 
Study
Date 
Implemented
Programme 
Description
Method of 
Analysis Sample Measure/s of Decentralization Results
Identification 
Strategy No.
Health
1 Uchimura and 
Jutting (2009)
China 1970s Devolved expenditure but 
growingly centralized revenue 
authority, responsibility for 
delivery of health services, no 
political devolution
OLS using a fixed 
effects model
26 provinces over period 1995 - 
2001
▪ LG expenditure / LG own revenue
▪ LG expenditure / provincial expenditure
▪ Higher LG expenditure is associated with lower IMR Strongly Credible 1
2 Asfaw et al (2007) India 1980s Rule-based fiscal transfers to 
LG, responsibility for public 
services, political devolution
OLS using 
between, fixed and 
random effects 
models
14 States over period 1990 - 1997 ▪ Index determined by factor analysis - share 
of LG expenditure in state, total LG 
expenditure per person, share of LG own 
revenue in LG expenditure
▪ D significantly associated with lower IMR in fixed and 
random effects model but not in the between effects 
model
Somewhat Credible 2
3 Habibi et al (2003) Argentina 1991 Decentralized financing, staff 
management and budgeting 
to LG. 
OLS using a fixed 
effects model, GLS
23 of 23 provinces over 1970 to 
1994
▪ Share of resources in provincial control to 
total resources
▪ Share of locally generated resources to 
locally controlled resources
▪ Share of locally generated to locally controlled 
resources is associated with lower infant mortality rates
Somewhat Credible 3
4 Khaleghian (2004) Cross-country Various Various OLS using between 
effects model with 
time fixed effects
140 Low and Middle Income 
countries over period 1980 - 1997
▪ Presence of taxing, spending or regulatory 
authority by LGs
▪ D associated with higher coverage in lower income 
countries, and lower coverage in higher income countries 
- L shape suggested
Somewhat Credible 4
5 Inchauste (2009) Bolivia 1994 Increase in transfers to LGs 
following HIPC initiative - 
2000 onwards
OLS using a 
random effects 
model
300 municipalities over period 
1999 - 2002
▪ Change in spending in health ▪ Decrease in share of unattended illness during period
▪ No significant change in cases of respiratory diseases
Somewhat Credible 5
6 Robalino et al 
(2001)
Cross-country Various Various OLS using a fixed 
effects model
Low and High Income countries 
over period 1970 - 1995
▪ Expenditures managed by LG / managed by 
CG
▪ 10% increase in share of locally managed expenditures 
is associated with 3.6% reduction in IMR for USD2k per 
capita country
▪ Benefits U shaped - higher for high and low income 
countries and low for middle income
Somewhat Credible 6
7 Treisman (2002) Cross-country Various Various OLS Up to 166 countries with cross-
sectional data collected from mid-
90s
▪ Presence of LG exclusive authority on any 
one item
▪ Some other measures of fiscal and political 
decentralization also used
▪ No significant association of sub-national autonomy 
with either indicator
▪ Electoral accountability associated with greater access 
to medication
Less Credible 7
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Education
8 Faguet and 
Sanchez (2008)
Colombia Phased beginning 
in 1970s - key 
reform in 1991
Increase in devolved funds to 
LG, greater responsibility for 
public services, political 
devolution
OLS and 2SLS 90% of municipalities universe 
over period 1994 to 2004
▪ LG own revenue sources / LG expenditure
▪ Binary factor of Municipal Certification
▪ Share of transfers to education expenditure
▪ D positively associated with higher enrolment in public 
school
Strongly Credible 8
9 Galiani et al (2008) Argentina 1991 Decentralized financing, staff 
management and budgeting 
to LG. Schools choose 
textbooks and teaching 
methods.
Difference in 
differences 
Almost all secondary schools over 
period 1994 to 1999
▪ Actual transfer from province to LG ▪ D associated with higher Math and Spanish scores Strongly Credible 9
10 Aslam and Yilmaz 
(2011)
Pakistan 2001 Limited financial devolution 
but implementation of rule-
based transfers, 
responsibility for public 
services, political devolution
OLS using a fixed 
effects model
183 villages from 5 districts out of 
120+. Data collected for 1995 to 
2007
▪ Binary measure of before and after D 
implementation 
▪ Magnitude of education services increases after 
introduction of D
Somewhat Credible 10
11 Freinkman and 
Plekhanov (2009)
Russia Phased beginning 
in 1994
Increased fiscal powers with 
rule-based transfers, 
responsibility for public 
services
OLS using a 
between effects 
model
Secondary school results from 73 
out of 83 regions, tested in 2004 
and 2005
▪ Share of LG education expenditure financed 
by own revenue
▪ Type of decentralization arrangement
▪ D associated with higher test scores Somewhat Credible 11
12 Habibi et al (2003) Argentina 1991 Decentralized financing, staff 
management and budgeting 
to LG. 
OLS using a fixed 
effects model, GLS
23 of 23 provinces over 1970 to 
1994
▪ Share of resources in provincial control to 
total resources
▪ Share of locally generated resources to 
locally controlled resources
▪ Share of locally generated to locally controlled 
resources is associated with higher enrolment 
Somewhat Credible 12
13 Inchauste (2009) Bolivia 1994 Increase in transfers to LGs 
following HIPC initiative - 
2000 onwards
OLS using a 
random effects 
model
300 municipalities over period 
1999 - 2005
▪ Change in transfers for education
▪ Change in spending in education
▪ Increase in share of unenrolled children associated with 
increase in transfers
▪ No significant impact of change in spending
Somewhat Credible 13
14 Di Gropello (2002) Chile Early 1980s Some increase in devolved 
funds to LG, greater 
responsibility for public 
services. In 1990s, greater 
pedagogical devolution to 
schools
OLS 50 municipalities (out of 355) - 
Student tests conducted in 1996
▪ LG own funds / Total funds spent on 
education
▪ School level parameters on participation, 
autonomy
▪ Municipal financial autonomy not significant
▪ Municipal training spend and wage incentives positively 
associated with test scores
▪ School involvement in financial decision-making 
positively associated with test scores
▪ School pedagogical and curricular autonomy positively 
associated with test scores
Less Credible 14
15 Jimenez and 
Paqueo (1996)
Philippines 1987 School councils raise funds, 
while LGs earmark taxes for 
supplemental school 
compensation
OLS 600 elementary schools over 
period 1982 to 1983
▪ Proportion of school revenues from local 
sources
▪ Locally financed schools have lower financial 
expenditure, indicating cost efficiency
Less Credible 15
16 Lockheed and 
Zhao (1993)
Philippines 1987 School councils raise funds, 
while LGs earmark taxes for 
supplemental school 
compensation
OLS comparison of 
private, national 
and local 
government 
schools/ HLM
8k 9th grade students in 214 
schools
▪ Local government school status ▪ No significant impact Less Credible 16
17 Treisman (2002) Cross-country Various Various OLS Up to 166 countries with cross-
sectional data collected from mid-
90s
▪ Presence of LG exclusive authority on any 
one item
▪ Some other measures of fiscal and political 
decentralization also used
▪ Negative and significant relationships between 
measures of decentralization and illiteracy
Less Credible 17
 38 of 46 
  
School-based Management (SBM)
18 Duflo et al (2007) Kenya 2005 Randomized trial which gave 
school councils money and 
autonomy to hire extra 
teachers and monitor their 
performance
OLS comparison of 
treatment and 
control groups. 
Alternate 
specification uses 
covariates
21k students from 210 schools ▪ Dummy variable indicating treatment group SBM associated with
▪ Increase in Mathematics scores of 0.24 standard 
deviations
▪ Increase in Language scores of 0.18 standard 
deviations
Very Strongly 
Credible
18
19 Glewwe and Maiga 
(2011)
Madagascar 2005 Randomized trial in which 
materials, training and 
greater accountability is given 
to three levels of districts, sub-
districts and schools
OLS comparison of 
treatment and 
control groups. 
20k students from 30 districts over 
period 2006 to 2007
▪ Dummy variable indicating treatment group ▪ No significant association with test scores Very Strongly 
Credible
19
20 Gertler et al (2011) Mexico 1996 Small grants to parent 
councils and parental training 
targeted at disadvantaged 
areas - AGE
Difference in 
differences 
30,000 students from 6,000 
schools over 1997 - 2001
▪ Dummy variable indicating whether school 
received AGE intervention
SBM associated with
▪ Reduction in failure rates by 4%
▪ Reduction in repetition rates by 5.4%
▪ No impact on drop-out rates
Strongly Credible 20
21 Hanushek et al 
(2011)
Cross-country Various Various OLS with country 
fixed effects
1mn students from 42 countries - 4 
waves of PISA from 2000 to 2009
▪ Autonomy over curriculum and pedagogy
▪ Autonomy over personnel management
▪ Autonomy over budgeting decision
▪ Overall negative association between autonomy and 
scores
Somewhat Credible 21
22 Skoufias and 
Shapiro (2006)
Mexico 2001 Annual grants of up to USD 
15k given to schools/SMCs to 
improve education quality 
OLS and 
Difference-in-
differences with 
matching
75000 schools over period 2001 - 
2004
▪ School received PEC grant in all three 
years
▪ School received PEC grant in any one year
SBM associated with
▪ 0.24 lower dropout rates
▪ 0.24 lower failure rates
▪ 0.31 lower repetition rates
Strongly Credible 22
23 Di Gropello and 
Marshall (2005)
Honduras 1999 Community schools where 
SMCs can hire/ fire teachers, 
manage school funds and 
maintain infrastructure
OLS with heckman 
correction model
200 rural schools tested in 2002 
and 2003
▪ Probit model predicting participation in 
PROHECO school
SBM associated with 
▪ Higher science scores but with no change in Math or 
Language test scores
▪ Marginally lower dropout rates
Somewhat Credible 23
24 Gunnarsson et al 
(2009)
Cross-country Various Various OLS and 2SLS 17k students from 10 Latam 
countries - 1997 survey data
▪ Autonomy of school in decisions regarding 
hiring, budget allocation, curriculum design, 
etc.
▪ Participation of parents and communities in 
school
▪ Autonomy associated with lower test scores
▪ Participation associated with higher test scores
Somewhat Credible 24
25 Jimenez and 
Sawada (1999)
El Salvador 1991 Community schools where 
SMCs can hire/ fire teachers, 
manage school funds and 
maintain infrastructure
OLS with heckman 
correction model
605 3rd grade students from 162 
municipalities - data from 1996
▪ Binary indicating whether it is an EDUCO 
school or not
▪ No association with Math or English test scores
▪ Students in EDUCO schools have lower absenteeism
Somewhat Credible 25
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26 Khattri et al (2010) Philippines 2003 Training and direct funding for 
school improvement
Difference in 
differences with 
matching
5k schools from 23 districts over 
2003 to 2005
▪ Dummy variable indicating whether school 
received intervention in first year
SBM associated with
▪ 1.45 percentage points overall improvement
▪ 1.82 percentage points improvement in Science
▪ 1.32 percentage points improvement in English
▪ 1.88 percentage points improvement in Mathematics
Somewhat Credible 26
27 King and Ozler 
(2000)
Nicaragua 1991 Autonomous schools with 
SMCs that can hire/ fire 
teachers, manage school 
funds and maintain 
infrastructure
Matching + 
validation using 
fixed effects and IV
3000 students from primary and 
secondary schools over period 
1995 - 1997
▪ De jure autonomy - binary variable of 
whether the school is autonomous by law or 
not
▪ De facto autonomy - actual school autonomy 
in various areas 
▪ No impact of de jure Autonomy
▪ Positive association of de facto Autonomy with Math 
and Spanish, no association with Language
Somewhat Credible 27
28 Paes de Barros 
and Mendonca 
(1998)
Brazil 1982 SBM with three key 
innovations: 
▪ Financial autonomy of 
schools
▪ Ability to elect principals
▪ Presence of school councils
Difference in 
differences - state-
level
18 states over period 1981 - 1993 ▪ Financial autonomy of schools
▪ Ability to elect principals
▪ Presence of school councils
▪ Lower repetition rates associated with financial 
autonomy
▪ Lower mean grade level lag associated with financial 
autonomy and school councils
▪ Lower proportion of students with lag associated with 
school council presence. 
▪ Proportion of students with lag negatively associated 
with principal election
Somewhat Credible 28
29 Parker (2005) Nicaragua 1991 Autonomous schools with 
SMCs that can hire/ fire 
teachers, manage school 
funds and maintain 
infrastructure
Matching 1000 3rd and 6th grade students - 
tested in 2002
School autonomy in various areas SBM associated with
▪ Higher third grade Math scores
▪ Lower sixth grade Math scores
▪ No association with Spanish scores
Somewhat Credible 29
30 Sawada and 
Ragatz (2005)
El Salvador 1991 Community schools where 
SMCs can hire/ fire teachers, 
manage school funds and 
maintain infrastructure
Matching 605 3rd grade students from 162 
municipalities - data from 1996
▪ Binary indicating whether it is an EDUCO 
school or not
▪ No association with scores
▪ Lower teacher absenteeism in EDUCO schools
Somewhat Credible 30
31 Eskeland and 
Filmer (2007)
Argentina 1978 Decentralized financing, staff 
management and budgeting 
to LG. Schools choose 
textbooks and teaching 
methods.
OLS with province 
fixed effects
24000 6th and 7th grade students 
from urban schools
▪ Autonomy of school in various decisions
▪ Participation of parents
SBM associated with
▪ Higher Math but no change in Language scores
▪ Effect is stronger for poorer households
Less Credible 31
Notes
PM: Allocative Efficiency
TE: Technical Efficiency
D: Decentralization
LG: Local Government
 4.  Conclusions  
 
How do the conclusions of our review compare with those of other broad surveys 
that, at various points over the past 25 years, have assessed the state of the field, 
attempting to reach concrete conclusions about decentralization’s empirical effects? One 
of the broadest and most widely cited international surveys is Rondinelli, Cheema and 
Nellis (1983), who argue that reformers hopes for decentralization usually outrun the 
reality. Serious administrative problems bedeviled implementation in most of the 
developing countries they survey. The few comprehensive evaluations of the costs and 
benefits of decentralization that had been conducted then indicated limited success in 
some countries and failure in others. 
A decade and a half later, surveys by Manor (1999), Piriou-Sall (1998), and Smoke 
(2001) are only somewhat more positive, with many caveats about weakness in the 
evidence favoring reform. Manor notes that the evidence, though extensive, is 
nevertheless incomplete, while Smoke finds the evidence mixed and anecdotal, and asks 
whether there is empirical justification for pursuing the reform at all. Litvack et al. 
(1999) have a darker view: “It is not much of an exaggeration to say that one can prove, 
or, disprove, almost any proposition about decentralization by throwing together some 
set of cases or data” (p.30). Treisman’s (2007) more recent review of the literature is 
bleakest of all.  He finds results on the effects of decentralization mixed at best, and for 
the most part weak and incomplete. On the consequences of decentralization, he 
concludes “Almost nothing that is robust or general has emerged” (p.268).   
Our own survey of the scholarship at first glance corroborates such conclusions. The 
evidence for decentralization’s effects do appear to be weak, incomplete and at many 
times inconclusive. But when we organize the empirical literature first by theme and 
then – crucially – by quality of evidence provided, we are able to identify patterns of 
empirical results that previous surveys – including our own6 – have missed. Admittedly, 
these patterns are not conclusive across all areas of interest. But in many instances they 
show that reforms can have clear, positive consequences – in some cases remarkably so, 
as we have attempted to outline above. This is very different from the general 
                                                 
6 See for example Faguet 2004, Faguet 2008, and Faguet and Sánchez 2008. 
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indeterminacy that previous surveys find, and particularly important to the extent that 
evidence informs real world policy-making. 
Still, many important questions remain unanswered. The variation in research 
findings in even the higher quality literature, for instance, implies that decentralization 
may work well in one context but not in another. Thus, one critical avenue for further 
research is the factors or prerequisites that enable improved outcomes after the 
intervention is made. A handful of studies from our review attempt to shed light on this 
aspect – Asfaw et al. (2007), for instance, contend that the presence of political rights 
enhances the consequences of decentralized health delivery, while Duflo et al. (2007) 
demonstrate that training and capacity building prior to implementation can deliver even 
better student outcomes. But a lack of focus on this crucial facet7 means that to date the 
conditions that facilitate enhanced service delivery post reform have remained elusive. 
A related area where the literature appears wanting is the channel through which 
improved service provision is achieved. In other words, when decentralization works, 
how exactly is it that it works? While there are often suggestions of better monitoring or 
improved incentives in the favorable evidence base, few studies provide systematic 
evidence to substantiate these claims. This deficiency restricts the policy implications 
scholarship can have for developing countries trying to implement, or even improve, 
their own reform.  
Finally, it is difficult to step away from our review without reiterating the 
methodological challenges faced by empiricists in this arena. Undoubtedly, scarce data, 
big bang implementation and all-encompassing reform packages make it difficult to 
disentangle the causal effects of decentralized service delivery. The weaknesses of 
evidence pointed out above are not shortcomings of logic, less still of skill on the part of 
researchers.  Rather, they are direct consequences of a combination of the data 
limitations that we all work under, plus the complexity of the questions we seek to 
answer. 
The last decade has seen great improvements in identification as better data has 
become available, and more recently years have brought us the first randomized trials in 
the field. Understandably, implementing RCTs in the broader education and health 
decentralization reform is a much more challenging task. Yet there are other possibilities 
                                                 
7 For good recent exceptions focusing on enablers, see Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) and Loayza et 
al. (2011) 
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that can add to the credibility of the research base. Early involvement of researchers 
together with cooperation with government agencies, for example, can allow for quasi-
randomized design. And the use of panel data can help mitigate many of the econometric 
challenges associated with cross-sectional work. As this body of work grows, it will 
become possible to draw firmer conclusions on the effects of decentralization on service 
provision. 
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